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WHO’s Public Health Mandate
• WHO Constitution of 1948
• International Health Regulations (2005)
– “public health emergency of international concern”
• World Health Assembly resolution 55.16 (2002)
– "Global public health response to natural occurrence, 
accidental release or deliberate use of biological and 
chemical agents or radionuclear material that affect 
health”
• World Health Assembly resolution 58.29 (2005)
– "Enhancement of laboratory biosafety"
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From January 2001 to December 2005 
WHO has verified 949 events fulfilling 
the criteria of Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern
Actions taken on Events
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Bio-Risks from laboratory accidents
• SARS, Singapore, 2003
• SARS, Taiwan, 2003
• SARS, China, 2004
• Tularaemia, USA, 2004
• Ebola, Russian 
Federation, 2004
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Bio-Risks from deliberate use
• Low probability, high 
consequence
• New technology 
(biotechnology and genetic 
engineering)
• The Biological Weapons 
Convention has provisions 
for assistance in case of  
attack or threat of attack, 



































• Identify and link assets of public health, 
molecular typing and high consequence 
agent laboratory networks
• Develop a benefits package for networks 
such as training on biosafety, standardized 
templates, protection of intellectual property
• Coordinated multi-center studies to 












~175 000–220 000 samples
15 000–40 000 isolates
2 000–10 000 viruses characterized
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WHO guidance for 
public health preparedness
• Health aspects of chemical and biological 
weapons. Report of a WHO group of 
consultants (1970)
• Public health response to biological and 
chemical weapons: WHO guidance (2004)
• Managing the health risks of the deliberate 
use of biological and chemical agents or 
radioactive material: guidance on capacity 
assessment (being finalized)
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Managing risks to public health posed by 







• Laboratory Biosafety Manual,
3rd Edition (2004)
• Laboratory Biosecurity Guidelines (being 
finalized)
• Coordination of global Biosafety networks
– WHO Biosafety Advisory Group (BAG) 
• UN Model Regulations
– Transport of infectious substances
• Visits to the smallpox repositories 
laboratories
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The implications of life science R&D for 
global health security
The Objective is to raise awareness
1. Importance of health research
2. Risks posed by misuse of valuable research and materials
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The implications of life science R&D for global 
health security
Phase 1 (completed):
– background paper (available on 
the web)
– international network of individuals 
and institutions
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The implications of life science R&D for global 
health security
Phase 2 (being started): milestones
– Study Group
– Web platform for project feedback




The need for a global partnership
• Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
• More than 100 CBW experts from all WHO regions which have 
contributed to the 2nd edition of the Public health response to 
biological and chemical weapons: WHO guidance
• Informal network of individuals with expertise on CBW-related 
issues
• Biosafety Advisory Group (BAG)
• Disease specific laboratory and expert networks (anthrax, 
tularaemia, smallpox)
• Other International Organizations, e.g. FAO, IAEA, ICGEB, 
OIE, OPCW, UN, UNICRI, etc. 
• Last, but not least, we are grateful for the support of Sloan 
Foundation, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and Australian, 
Canadian, Italian, Swiss and US Governments, and others
